8.3
For his men were now confident of success in spite of their inferior numbers, and he would not find them less keen after they had received reinforcements, nay, their superiority would lead them to fight all the better. And besides, delay was to their advantage, since they had everything in abundance, while to the enemy time would bring a scarcity of supplies, since they were occupying a hostile country.
8.4
So Paulinus argued, and Marius Celsus voted with him. Annius Gallus was not present, being under treatment for a fall from his horse, but Otho asked his advice by letter, and his counsel was not to hasten the battle, but to await the forces from Mysia, which were already on the march. Nevertheless, Otho would not listen to these counsels, and the day was carried by those who urged immediate battle.
9.1
Various other reasons for this are given by various writers; but manifestly the praetorian soldiers, as they were called, who served as the emperor’s guards, since they were now getting a more generous taste of real military service and longed for their accustomed life of diversion at Rome in which festivals abounded and war was unknown, could not be restrained, but were eager for the battle, feeling sure that at the very first onset they would overwhelm their opponents.
9.2
Moreover, it would seem that Otho himself could not longer bear up against the uncertainty of the issue, nor endure (so effeminate was he and so unused to command) his own thoughts of the dire peril confronting him; but worn out by his anxieties, he veiled his eyes, like one about to leap from a precipice, and hastened to commit his cause to fortune.
9.3
And this is the account given by Secundus the rhetorician, who was Otho’s secretary. But others would tell us that both armies were strongly inclined to confer; and above all, if they could agree, to elect as emperor the best of the commanders who were with them, but if not, to convene the senate and commit to it the choice of an emperor.
