9.4
And since neither of the men who then had the title of emperor enjoyed high repute, it is not unlikely that the real soldiers, those who knew what hardship was and had sense, should be led to reflect that it would be a dreadful and most hateful thing if the evils which the citizens had once to their sorrow inflicted upon one another and suffered because of Sulla and Marius, and again because of Caesar and Pompey, should now be endured again only to make the imperial power a means for providing for the gluttony and drunkenness of Vitellius or for the luxury and licentiousness of Otho.
9.5
It is suspected, then, that Celsus was aware of these feelings, and therefore tried to interpose delay, hoping that the issue would thus be decided without hardship and battle, and that Otho, fearing this, hastened on the battle.
10.1
Otho himself returned to Brixillum, and in this too he made a mistake, not only because he took away from the combatants the respect and ambition which his presence and oversight inspired, but also because, by leading away as his bodyguard of foot and horse the men who were most vigorous and eager to please him, he cut away, as it were, the head and front of his army.
10.2
During this time there was also a conflict at the river Po, where Caecina tried to build a bridge across the stream, and Otho’s soldiers attacked him and tried to prevent it. Not succeeding, Otho’s men loaded their vessels with torchwood full of sulphur and pitch, and began to cross the river; but a blast of wind suddenly smote the material which they had prepared for use against the enemy, and fanned it afire.
10.3
First smoke arose from it, then bright flames, so that the crews were confounded and leaped overboard into the river, upsetting their boats, and putting themselves at the mercy of a jeering enemy. Moreover, the Germans attacked Otho’s gladiators at an island in the river, overpowered them and slew not a few of them.
