Περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν πρὸς τοὺς Στωικοὺς

Lines

1 – 1 1 – 1 2 – 2 3 – 4 5 – 5 6 – 6 7 – 7 8 – 8 9 – 9 10 – 10 11 – 11 12 – 12 13 – 13 14 – 14 15 – 16 16 – 16 17 – 17 18 – 18 19 – 19 20 – 20 21 – 22 22 – 22 22 – 22 23 – 23 24 – 24 25 – 25 26 – 26 26 – 26 27 – 27 27 – 27 27 – 27 28 – 28 28 – 29 30 – 30 30 – 30 31 – 31 31 – 32 33 – 33 34 – 34 35 – 35 36 – 36 37 – 37 37 – 37 38 – 38 38 – 38 39 – 39 40 – 40 41 – 41 42 – 42 43 – 43 44 – 44 45 – 45 46 – 46 47 – 47 48 – 48 49 – 49 50 – 50

İngilizce Yunanca

26 DIADUMENUS. It is likewise against common sense when he says that there may be two ends or scopes proposed of life, and that all the things we do are not to be referred to one; and yet this is more against common sense, to say that there is an end, and yet that every action is to be referred to another. Nevertheless they must of necessity endure one of these. For if those things which are first according to Nature are not eligible for themselves, but the choice and taking of them agreeably to reason is so, and if every one therefore does all his actions for the acquiring the first things according to Nature, it follows that all things which are done must have their reference to this, that the principal things according to Nature may be obtained. But they think that they who aim and aspire to get these things do not have the things themselves for the end, but that to which they must refer, namely, the choice and not the things. For the end indeed is to choose and receive these things prudently. But the things themselves and the enjoying of them are not the end, but the material object, having its worth only from the choice. For it is my opinion that they both use and write this very expression, to show the difference.

26 LAMPRIAS. You have exactly related both what they say and in what manner they deliver it.