Book 4
4.9
But I vow you shall not hear unless you first declare your own opinion about the nature of Justice; for it’s enough that you mock at others, questioning and examining everybody, and never willing to render an account yourself or to state an opinion about anything.Indeed, Hippias!
4.10
Haven’t you noticed that I never cease to declare my notions of what is just?And how can you call that an account?I declare them by my deeds, anyhow, if not by my words. Don’t you think that deeds are better evidence than words?Yes, much better, of course; for many say what is just and do what is unjust; but no one who does what is just can be unjust.
4.11
Then have you ever found me dealing in perjury or calumny, or stirring up strife between friends or fellow-citizens, or doing any other unjust act?I have not.To abstain from what is unjust is just, don’t you think?Even now, Socrates, you are clearly endeavouring to avoid stating what you think Justice to be. You are saying not what the just do, but what they don’t do.
4.12
Well, I thought that unwillingness to do injustice was sufficient proof of Justice. But, if you don’t think so, see whether you like this better: I say that what is lawful is just.Cyropaedia I. iii. 17.Do you mean, Socrates, that lawful and just are the same thing?I do.
4.13
Because I don’t see what you mean by lawful or what you mean by just.Does the expression laws of a state convey a meaning to you?It does.And what do you think they are?Covenants made by the citizens whereby they have enacted what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided.Then would not that citizen who acts in accordance with these act lawfully, and he who transgresses them act unlawfully?Yes, certainly.And would not he who obeys them do what is just, and he who disobeys them do what is unjust?Certainly.Then would not he who does what is just be just, and he who does what is unjust be unjust?Of course.Consequently he who acts lawfully is just, and he who acts unlawfully is unjust.
