Book 4
4.24
Again, is not the duty of requiting benefits universally recognised by law?Yes, but this law too is broken.Then does not a man pay forfeit for the breach of that law too, in the gradual loss of good friends and the necessity of hunting those who hate him? Or is it not true that, whereas those who benefit an acquaintance are good friends to him, he is hated by them for his ingratitude, if he makes no return, and then, because it is most profitable to enjoy the acquaintance of such men, he hunts them most assiduously?Assuredly, Socrates, all this does suggest the work of the gods. For laws that involve in themselves punishment meet for those who break them, must, I think, be framed by a better legislator than man.
4.25
Then, Hippias, do you think that the gods ordain what is just or what is otherwise?Not what is otherwise — of course not; for if a god ordains not that which is just, surely no other legislator can do so.Consequently, Hippias, the gods too accept the identification of just and lawful.By such words and actions he encouraged Justice in those who resorted to his company.
5.1
He did also try to make his companions efficient in affairs, as I will now show. For holding that it is good for anyone who means to do honourable work to have self-control, he made it clear to his companions, in the first place, that he had been assiduous in self-discipline;Cyropaedia VIII. i. 32. moreover, in his conversation he exhorted his companions to cultivate self-control above all things.
5.2
Thus he bore in mind continually the aids to virtue, and put all his companions in mind of them. I recall in particular the substance of a conversation that he once had with Euthydemus on self-control.Tell me, Euthydemus, he said, do you think that freedom is a noble and splendid possession both for individuals and for communities?Yes, I think it is, in the highest degree.