11
Now all these instances, where I appear to have had a clearer foresight than the rest, I shall not refer to a single cause, men of Athens—my real or pretended clevernessThe Greek here is difficult. Most edd. awkwardly render ἀλαζονεία [cause for] boasting: it is rather political quackery passing muster for real statesmanship.; nor will I claim that my knowledge and discernment were due to anything else than two things, which I will mention. One, men of Athens, was good luck, which my experience tells me is worth all the cleverness and wisdom in the world.
12
The second is this: on public questions my estimates and decisions are disinterested, and no one can show that my policy and my speeches have been in any way bound up with my private gain. Hence I always see accurately the advantageous course as suggested by actual circumstances. But the instant you throw money into one scale, its weight bears down the judgement with it; and for him that has once done this, accurate and sound calculation becomes utterly impossible.
13
Now there is one precaution which I think essential. If anyone proposes to negotiate for our city an alliance or a joint contributionA euphemism under the second Athenian confederacy for the tribute (φόρος) of the first. or anything of the sort, it must be done without detriment to the existing peace. I do not mean that the peace is a glorious one or even creditable to you, but, whatever we may think of it, it would better suit our purpose never to have made it than to violate it when made, because we have now sacrificed many advantages which would have made war safer and easier for us then than now.
