49
Yet the law distinctly provides that beyond the frontier a man shall not be pursued, whereas you permit him to be seized anywhere. Beyond the frontier the law forbids not only pursuit but also seizure; and yet according to your decree anyone who chooses will take as an outcast and forcibly seize a man who has slain without intention, and carry him by violence into the country of the slain man. Are you not treating human conduct indiscriminately, and ignoring the motives according to which a given act is either virtuous or immoral?—
50
Observe, gentlemen, that this is a universal distinction: it does not apply only to questions of homicide. If a man strike another, giving the first blow, says the law. The implication is that he is not guilty, if the blow was defensive. If a man revile another,—with false hoods, the law adds, implying that, if he speaks the truth, he is justified. If a man slay another with malice aforethought,—indicating that it is not the same thing if he does it unintentionally. If a man injures another with intention, wrongfully. Everywhere we shall find that it is the motive that fixes the character of the act. But not with you: you say, without qualification, if any man slay Charidemus, he shall be seized, though he do it unwittingly, or righteously, or in self-defence, or for a purpose permitted by law, or in any way whatsoever.
51
Read the statute that comes next.
51
Statute
51
No man shall be liable to proceedings for murder because he lays information against exiles, if any such exile return to a prohibited place.
