29
You have heard the law, men of Athens; and I beg you to examine it and observe how admirably and most righteously it is framed by the legislator. He uses the term murderers; but in the first place you see that by murderer he means a man found guilty by verdict; for no man comes under that designation until he has been convicted and found guilty.
30
That is made clear both in the earlier statute and in this one; for in the former, after the words if any man kill, the legislator directs the Council to take cognizance, and here, after designating the man as the murderer, he has directed what is to be done to him. That is to say, when it is a question of accusation, he has ordered a trial, but when the culprit, being found guilty, is liable to this designation, he has specified the penalty. Therefore he should be speaking only of persons found guilty. Well, what does he direct? That it shall be lawful to kill them and to put them under arrest.
31
Does he say that they are to be taken to the house of the prosecutor, or as he pleases? No, indeed. How are they to be arrested? As directed on the first turning-table, is the phrase; and you all know what that means. The judicial archons are there authorized to punish with death persons who have gone into exile on a charge of murder. Only last year you all saw the culprit who was arrested by them in the Assembly.
32
It is to the archons, then, that the murderer is to be taken on arrest; and that differs from being taken to the house of the prosecutor in this respect, men of Athens,—that the captor who carries a man to the judges gives control of the malefactor to the laws, while the captor who takes him home gives such control to himself. In the former case punishment is suffered as the law enjoins; in the latter, as the captor pleases; and of course it makes a vast difference whether the retribution is controlled by the law or by a private enemy.
