13
But for my part, men of the jury, in the first place I do not think that a defence of that sort is legitimate, or that it is proper, when one is manifestly shown to be in the wrong, for him to shift the charges and have recourse to accusation and calumny; nay, for his counter-charges, if he is suffering any wrong, he will plainly receive satisfaction, but for the claims made on him, he will give it. For how could I now defend myself against the slanders of these men, if I passed over the matters upon which you are to give your verdict?
14
In the next place I wonder, if he had true and just demands to make, why it was that, when our friends wished to settle our differences, and many conferences were held, he could not abide by their decision. And yet who could better have exposed the baselessness of claims advanced by him or by me than those who were present at all these transactions, who knew the facts as well as we did ourselves, and who were impartial friends of us both?
15
But this was plainly not to the interest of my opponent—that he should be openly convicted by our friends and find a settlement in this way. For do not imagine, men of the jury, that men who know all these facts, and who now at their own risk are giving testimony in my favor, would then, when they had been put under oath, have formed a different conclusion about them. However, though you had none of these facts to aid you, even so it is not difficult to form an opinion as to which of the two parties is speaking the truth.
