55
Ah, but he will say that he has heard from his father the facts to which he has sworn. But the law does not admit hearsay evidence, save in the case of deceased persons; whereas this fellow has dared to swear to acts done by his father, while that father is still alive. Then again, why did Leostratus here inscribe on the affidavit the name, not of himself, but of the defendant? For the older facts should have been sworn to by the older man. It was, he might say, because I have had this youth adopted as son to Archiades.
56
Well then, you who had him adopted and concocted the whole affair ought to have rendered an account of it, and made yourself responsible for what you have done. You ought absolutely to have done so. But you evaded this, and wrote over the affidavit the name of your son here, who knew nothing of the matter. You see, then, men of the jury, that the statements in the affidavit are false, and they are admitted by these men themselves to be so. Why, it would even be right for you to refuse to listen to this man Leostratus, when he presently undertakes to make statements to which he did not venture to swear in the affidavit.
57
Furthermore, that affidavits of objection are of all forms of trial the most unjust, and that those having recourse to them are most deserving of your resentment, one can see very clearly from the following facts. In the first place, they are not necessary as the other forms of procedure are, but they are instituted by the will and desire of the one swearing to them.The affidavit of objection (διαμαρτύρια), like the special plea in bar of action (παραγραφή), afforded a means by which the defendant could prevent a case from being tried upon its merits, and so could be regarded as a means of thwarting the course of justice. If in the matter of disputed claims there is no other way of getting a judgement than by such an affidavit, it is perhaps necessary to make one.
