17
Further, in making their charge, the prosecution invoke the principle that the responsibility rests with whoever told the boy to drink the poison, forced him to drink it, or gave it to him to drink. By that very principle, however, I will myself prove that I am innocent: for I neither told the boy to drink the poison, nor forced him to drink it, nor gave it to him to drink. I will even go a step further than they and add that I did not witness him drink it. If the prosecution say that it was a criminal act to tell him to drink it, I am no criminal: I did not tell him to drink it. If they say that it was a criminal act to force him to drink it, I am no criminal: I did not force him to drink it. And if they say that the responsibility rests with the person who gave him the poison, I am not responsible: I did not give it to him.
18
Now accusations and lies can be indulged in at will, as they are at the command of each one of us. But that what never happened should be transformed into fact, that an innocent man should be transformed into a criminal is not, I feel, a matter which depends upon the eloquence of the prosecution; it is a question of what is right and what is true. Admittedly, with a deliberately planned murder, carried out in secret and with none to witness it, the truth can only be determined from the accounts given by the prosecutor and the defendant, and from them alone; their statements must be followed up with care and suspected on the slightest grounds and the final verdict must necessarily be the result of conjecture rather than certain knowledge.
