31
yet, if there is to be pardon for those who have destroyed others to save themselves, you would be more justified in pardoning these intruders; for it was dangerous for them not to go where they were sent, and to deny that they had found the victims there. But Eratosthenes was free to say that he had not met his man, or else that he had not seen him for these were statements that did not admit of either disproof or inquisition; so that not even his enemies, however they might wish it, could have convicted him.
32
If in truth, Eratosthenes, you had been a good citizen, you ought far rather to have acted as an informant to those who were destined to an unjust death than to have laid hands on those who were to be unjustly destroyed. But the fact is that your deeds clearly reveal the man who, instead of feeling pain, took pleasure in what was being done; so that this court should take its verdict from your deeds, not from your words.
33
They should take what they know to have been done as evidence of what was said at the time, since it is not possible to produce witnesses of the latter. For we were restricted, not merely from attending their councils, but even from staying at home; and thus they have the licence, after doing all possible evil to the city, to say all possible good about themselves.
34
That one point, however, I do not contest; I admit, if you like, that you spoke in opposition. But I wonder what in the world you would have done if you had spoken in favour, when in spite of your alleged opposition you put Polemarchus to death. Now I would ask the court, even supposing that you had happened to be brothers or sons of this man, what would you have done? Acquitted him? For, gentlemen, Eratosthenes is bound to prove one of two things,—either that he did not arrest him, or that he did so with justice. But he has admitted that he laid hands on him unjustly,By stating that he spoke against it. so that he has made your verdict on himself an easy matter.
