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Socrates. I think you are correct, Euthyphro; but there is one little point about which I still want information, for I do not yet understand what you mean by attention. I don’t suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not?
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Euthyphro. Certainly.
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Socrates. Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
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Euthyphro. Yes.
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Socrates. And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
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Euthyphro. That is so.
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Socrates. Then the huntsman’s art is the art of attending to dogs?
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Euthyphro. Yes.
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Socrates. And the oxherd’s art is that of attending to oxen?
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Euthyphro. Certainly.
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Socrates. And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?
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Euthyphro. Yes.
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Socrates. Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman’s art are benefited and made better; or don’t you think so?
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Euthyphro. Yes, I do.
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Socrates. And dogs are benefited by the huntsman’s art and oxen by the oxherd’s and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?
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Euthyphro. No, by Zeus, I do not.
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Socrates. But for its benefit?
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Euthyphro. Of course.
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Socrates. Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?
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Euthyphro. No, by Zeus, not I.
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Socrates. Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by attention to the gods just because I did not think you meant anything like that.
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Euthyphro. You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.
