407
Hermogenes. Certainly.
407
Socrates. For God’s sake, let us leave the gods, as I am afraid to talk about them; but ask me about any others you please, that you may see what Euthyphro’s horses are.Cf. Hom. Il. 5.221, Hom. Il. 8.105.
407
Hermogenes. I will do so, but first one more god. I want to ask you about Hermes, since Cratylus says I am not Hermogenes (son of Hermes). Let us investigate the name of Hermes, to find out whether there is anything in what he says.
408
Socrates. Well then, this name Hermes seems to me to have to do with speech; he is an interpreter (ἡρμηνεύς) and a messenger, is wily and deceptive in speech, and is oratorical. All this activity is concerned with the power of speech. Now, as I said before, εἴρειν denotes the use of speech; moreover, Homer often uses the word ἐμήσατο, which means contrive. From these two words, then, the lawgiver imposes upon us the name of this god who contrived speech and the use of speech—εἴρεινmeans speak— and tells us: Ye human beings, he who contrived speech (εἴρειν ἐμήσατο) ought to be called Eiremes by you. We, however, have beautified the name, as we imagine, and call him Hermes. Iris also seems to have got her name from εἴρειν, because she is a messenger.
408
Hermogenes. By Zeus, I believe Cratylus was right in saying I was not Hermogenes; I certainly am no good contriver of speech.
408
Socrates. And it is reasonable, my friend, that Pan is the double-natured son of Hermes.
408
Hermogenes. How is that?
408
Socrates. You know that speech makes all things (πᾶν) known and always makes them circulate and move about, and is twofold, true and false.
408
Hermogenes. Certainly.