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Hermogenes. Yes, Socrates, for I cannot conceive of any other kind of correctness in names than this; I may call a thing by one name, which I gave, and you by another, which you gave. And in the same way, I see that states have their own different names for the same things, and Greeks differ from other Greeks and from barbarians in their use of names.
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Socrates. Now, Hermogenes, let us see. Do you think this is true of the real things, that their reality is a separate one for each person, as Protagoras said with his doctrine that man is the measure of all things—that things are to me such as they seem to me, and to you such as they seem to you—or do you think things have some fixed reality of their own?
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Hermogenes. It has sometimes happened to me, Socrates, to be so perplexed that I have been carried away even into this doctrine of Protagoras; but I do not at all believe he is right.
386
Socrates. Well, have you ever been carried away so far as not to believe at all that any man is bad?
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Hermogenes. Lord, no; but I have often been carried away into the belief that certain men, and a good many of them, are very bad.
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Socrates. Well, did you never think any were very good?
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Hermogenes. Very few.
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Socrates. But you did think them so?
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Hermogenes. Yes.
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Socrates. And what is your idea about that? Are the very good very wise and the very bad very foolish?
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Hermogenes. Yes, that is my opinion.
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Socrates. Now if Protagoras is right and the truth is as he says, that all things are to each person as they seem to him, is it possible for some of us to be wise and some foolish?
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Hermogenes. No, it is not.
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Socrates. And you are, I imagine, strongly of the opinion that if wisdom and folly exist, it is quite impossible that Protagoras is right, for one man would not in reality be at all wiser than another if whatever seems to each person is really true to him.
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Hermogenes. Quite right.