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Socrates. Are, then, these words about which you are now asking elements, and must we henceforth investigate their correctness by some other method?
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Hermogenes. Probably.
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Socrates. Yes, probably, Hermogenes; at any rate, all the previous words were traced back to these. But if this be true, as I think it is, come to my aid again and help me in the investigation, that I may not say anything foolish in declaring what principle must underlie the correctness of the earliest names.
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Hermogenes. Go on, and I will help you to the best of my ability.
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Socrates. I think you agree with me that there is but one principle of correctness in all names, the earliest as well as the latest, and that none of them is any more a name than the rest.
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Hermogenes. Certainly.
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Socrates. Now the correctness of all the names we have discussed was based upon the intention of showing the nature of the things named.
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Hermogenes. Yes, of course.
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Socrates. And this principle of correctness must be present in all names, the earliest as well as the later ones, if they are really to be names.
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Hermogenes. Certainly.
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Socrates. But the later ones, apparently, were able to accomplish this by means of the earlier ones.
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Hermogenes. Evidently.
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Socrates. Well, then, how can the earliest names, which are not as yet based upon any others, make clear to us the nature of things, so far as that is possible, which they must do if they are to be names at all? Answer me this question: If we had no voice or tongue, and wished to make things clear to one another, should we not try, as dumb people actually do, to make signs with our hands and head and person generally?
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Hermogenes. Yes. What other method is there, Socrates?