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Cratylus. I should say that the man in such a case was merely making a noise, going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot.
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Socrates. Let us see, Cratylus, if we cannot come to terms somehow. You would agree, would you not, that the name is one thing and the thing of which it is the name is another?
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Cratylus. Yes, I should.
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Socrates. And you agree that the name is an imitation of the thing named?
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Cratylus. Most assuredly.
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Socrates. And you agree that paintings also are imitations, though in a different way, of things?
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Cratylus. Yes.
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Socrates. Well then—for perhaps I do not understand, and you may be right—can both of these imitations, the paintings and the names, be assigned and applied to the things which they imitate, or not?
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Cratylus. They can.
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Socrates. First, then, consider this question: Can we assign the likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so forth?
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Cratylus. Certainly.
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Socrates. And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the woman, and the woman’s to the man?
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Cratylus. That is also possible.
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Socrates. And are these assignments both correct, or only the former?
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Cratylus. The former.
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Socrates. The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it.
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Cratylus. That is my view.
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Socrates. To put an end to contentious argument between you and me, since we are friends, let me state my position. I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations paintings and names—correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but true; and the other kind, which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call incorrect and, in the case of names, false.
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Cratylus. But it may be, Socrates, that this incorrect assignment is possible in the case of paintings, and not in the case of names, which must be always correctly assigned.