435
Cratylus. I think, Socrates, their function is to instruct, and this is the simple truth, that he who knows the names knows also the things named.
435
Socrates. I suppose, Cratylus, you mean that when anyone knows the nature of the name—and its nature is that of the thing—he will know the thing also, since it is like the name, and the science of all things which are like each other is one and the same. It is, I fancy, on this ground that you say whoever knows names will know things also.
435
Cratylus. You are perfectly right.
435
Socrates. Now let us see what this manner of giving instruction is, to which you refer, and whether there is another method, but inferior to this, or there is no other at all. What do you think?
436
Cratylus. I think there is no other at all; this is both the best and the only method.
436
Socrates. Do you think this is also the method of discovering realities, and that he who has discovered the names has discovered also the things named; or do you think inquiry and discovery demand another method, and this belongs to instruction?
436
Cratylus. I most certainly think inquiry and discovery follow this same method and in the same way.
436
Socrates. Let us consider the matter, Cratylus. Do you not see that he who in his inquiry after things follows names and examines into the meaning of each one runs great risks of being deceived?
436
Cratylus. How so?
436
Socrates. Clearly he who first gave names, gave such names as agreed with his conception of the nature of things. That is our view, is it not?
436
Cratylus. Yes.
436
Socrates. Then if his conception was incorrect, and he gave the names according to his conception, what do you suppose will happen to us who follow him? Can we help being deceived?