438
Socrates. Then since the names are in conflict, and some of them claim that they are like the truth, and others that they are, how can we decide, and upon what shall we base our decision? Certainly not upon other names differing from these, for there are none. No, it is plain that we must look for something else, not names, which shall show us which of these two kinds are the true names, which of them, that is to say, show the truth of things.
438
Cratylus. That is my opinion.
438
Socrates. Then if that is true, Cratylus, it seems that things may be learned without names.
438
Cratylus. So it appears.
438
Socrates. What other way is left by which you could expect to know them? What other than the natural and the straightest way, through each other, if they are akin, and through themselves? For that which is other and different from them would signify not them, but something other and different.
438
Cratylus. I think that is true.
439
Socrates. Stop for Heaven’s sake! Did we not more than once agree that names which are rightly given are like the things named and are images of them?
439
Cratylus. Yes.
439
Socrates. Then if it be really true that things can be learned either through names or through themselves which would be the better and surer way of learning? To learn from the image whether it is itself a good imitation and also to learn the truth which it imitates, or to learn from the truth both the truth itself and whether the image is properly made?
439
Cratylus. I think it is certainly better to learn from the truth.
439
Socrates. How realities are to be learned or discovered is perhaps too great a question for you or me to determine; but it is worth while to have reached even this conclusion, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from names but much better through themselves than through names.
439
Cratylus. That is clear, Socrates.