388
Hermogenes. He who has the skill.
389
Socrates. Then it is not for every man, Hermogenes, to give names, but for him who may be called the name-maker; and he, it appears, is the lawgiver, who is of all the artisans among men the rarest.
389
Hermogenes. So it appears.
389
Socrates. See now what the lawgiver has in view in giving names. Look at it in the light of what has gone before. What has the carpenter in view when he makes a shuttle? Is it not something the nature of which is to weave?
389
Hermogenes. Certainly.
389
Socrates. Well, then, if the shuttle breaks while he making it, will he make another with his mind fixed on that which is broken, or on that form with reference to which he was making the one which he broke?
389
Hermogenes. On that form, in my opinion.
389
Socrates. Then we should very properly call that the absolute or real shuttle?
389
Hermogenes. Yes, I think so.
389
Socrates. Then whenever he has to make a shuttle for a light or a thick garment, or for one of linen or of wool or of any kind whatsoever, all of them must contain the form or ideal of shuttle, and in each of his products he must embody the nature which is naturally best for each?
389
Hermogenes. Yes.
389
Socrates. And the same applies to all other instruments. The artisan must discover the instrument naturally fitted for each purpose and must embody that in the material of which he makes the instrument, not in accordance with his own will, but in accordance with its nature. He must, it appears, know how to embody in the iron the borer fitted by nature for each special use.
389
Hermogenes. Certainly.
389
Socrates. And he must embody in the wood the shuttle fitted by nature for each kind of weaving.
389
Hermogenes. True.
389
Socrates. For each kind of shuttle is, it appears, fitted by nature for its particular kind of weaving, and the like is true of other instruments.
389
Hermogenes. Yes.