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THEAET. Yes.
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SOC. Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all.
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THEAET. That seems to be true.
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SOC. But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole?
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THEAET. Yes, of the all.
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SOC. You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely that of which nothing is wanting?
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THEAET. Necessarily.
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SOC. And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.
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THEAET. I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.
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SOC. We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the whole and all of it will be all the parts?
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THEAET. Certainly.
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SOC. Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow necessarily that it contains the letters, not as parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with them?
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THEAET. It does.
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SOC. And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different from them?
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THEAET. Yes.
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SOC. Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters The reader is reminded that words στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή have the meanings element and combination as well as letter and syllable. of it?
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THEAET. Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts.
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SOC. Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to our present view, some indivisible concept.
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THEAET. I agree.