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SOC. Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in any given instance?
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THEAET. At any rate, it seems so.
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SOC. Then what becomes of the addition of reason or explanation to right opinion? For if it is defined as the addition of an opinion of the way in which a given thing differs from the rest, it is an utterly absurd injunction.
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THEAET. How so?
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SOC. When we have a right opinion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, we are told to acquire a right opinion of the way in which those same things differ from other things! On this plan the twirling of a scytale A σκυτάλη was a staff, especially a staff about which a strip of leather was rolled, on which dispatches were so written that when unrolled they were illegible until rolled again upon another staff of the same size and shape. or a pestle or anything of the sort would be as nothing compared with this injunction. It might more justly be called a blind man’s giving directions; for to command us to acquire that which we already have, in order to learn that of which we already have opinion, is very like a man whose sight is mightily darkened.
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THEAET. Tell me now, what did you intend to say when you asked the question a while ago?
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SOC. If, my boy, the command to add reason or explanation means learning to know and not merely getting an opinion about the difference, our splendid definition of knowledge would be a fine affair! For learning to know is acquiring knowledge, is it not?
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THEAET. Yes.
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SOC. Then, it seems, if asked, What is knowledge? our leader will reply that it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would, according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation.
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THEAET. So it seems.