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THEAET. We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we hear or see: in the case of the letters, we both see and know the form and color, and in the spoken language we both hear and at the same time know the higher and lower notes of the voice; but we do not perceive through sight or hearing, and we do not know, what the grammarians and interpreters teach about them.
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SOC. First-rate, Theaetetus! and it is a pity to dispute that, for I want you to grow. But look out for another trouble that is yonder coming towards us, and see how we can repel it.
163
THEAET. What is it?
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SOC. It is like this: If anyone should ask, Is it possible, if a man has ever known a thing and still has and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not, at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers? I seem to be pretty long winded; but I merely want to ask if a man who has learned a thing does not know it when he remembers it.
163
THEAET. Of course he does, Socrates; for what you suggest would be monstrous.
163
SOC. Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and that sight is perception?
163
THEAET. I do.
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SOC. Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing has acquired knowledge of that which he has seen?
163
THEAET. Yes.
163
SOC. Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory?
163
THEAET. Yes.
163
SOC. Memory of nothing or of something?
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THEAET. Of something, surely.
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SOC. Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things?
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THEAET. Of course.
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SOC. A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not?
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THEAET. He does.
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SOC. Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that?
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THEAET. It would be absurd to say that, Socrates.
164
SOC. We must, though, if we are to maintain our previous argument; otherwise, it is all up with it.
164
THEAET. I too, by Zeus, have my suspicions, but I don’t fully understand you. Tell me how it is.
