Thesauros Literature Philosophy Θεαίτητος

Θεαίτητος

Θεαίτητος Plato
164 SOC. This is how it is: he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all the same.
164 THEAET. Certainly.
164 SOC. But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?
164 THEAET. Yes.
164 SOC. But does not see is the same as does not know, if it is true that seeing is knowing.
164 THEAET. True.
164 SOC. Then this is our result. When a man has acquired knowledge of a thing and still remembers it, he does not know it, since he does not see it; but we said that would be a monstrous conclusion.
164 THEAET. Very true.
164 SOC. So, evidently, we reach an impossible result if we say that knowledge and perception are the same.
164 THEAET. So it seems.
164 SOC. Then we must say they are different.
164 THEAET. I suppose so.
164 SOC. Then what can knowledge be? We must, apparently, begin our discussion all over again. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we on the point of doing?
164 THEAET. About what?
164 SOC. It seems to me that we are behaving like a worthless game-cock; before winning the victory we have leapt away from our argument and begun to crow.
164 THEAET. How so?
164 SOC. We seem to be acting like professional debaters; we have based our agreements on the mere similarity of words and are satisfied to have got the better of the argument in such a way, and we do not see that we, who claim to be, not contestants for a prize, but lovers of wisdom, are doing just what those ingenious persons do.
164 THEAET. I do not yet understand what you mean.

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