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SOC. This is how it is: he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all the same.
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THEAET. Certainly.
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SOC. But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?
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THEAET. Yes.
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SOC. But does not see is the same as does not know, if it is true that seeing is knowing.
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THEAET. True.
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SOC. Then this is our result. When a man has acquired knowledge of a thing and still remembers it, he does not know it, since he does not see it; but we said that would be a monstrous conclusion.
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THEAET. Very true.
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SOC. So, evidently, we reach an impossible result if we say that knowledge and perception are the same.
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THEAET. So it seems.
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SOC. Then we must say they are different.
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THEAET. I suppose so.
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SOC. Then what can knowledge be? We must, apparently, begin our discussion all over again. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we on the point of doing?
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THEAET. About what?
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SOC. It seems to me that we are behaving like a worthless game-cock; before winning the victory we have leapt away from our argument and begun to crow.
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THEAET. How so?
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SOC. We seem to be acting like professional debaters; we have based our agreements on the mere similarity of words and are satisfied to have got the better of the argument in such a way, and we do not see that we, who claim to be, not contestants for a prize, but lovers of wisdom, are doing just what those ingenious persons do.
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THEAET. I do not yet understand what you mean.