169
SOC. Now if he himself were present and could agree to this, instead of our making the concession for him in our effort to help him, there would be no need of taking up the question again or of reinforcing his argument. But, as it is, perhaps it might be said that we have no authority to make the agreement for him; therefore it is better to make the agreement still clearer on this particular point; for it makes a good deal of difference whether it is so or not.
169
THEO. That is true.
170
SOC. Let us then get the agreement in as concise a form as possible, not through others, but from his own statement.
170
THEO. How?
170
SOC. In this way: He says, does he not? that which appears to each person really is to him to whom it appears.
170
THEO. Yes, that is what he says.
170
SOC. Well then, Protagoras, we also utter the opinions of a man, or rather, of all men, and we say that there is no one who does not think himself wiser than others in some respects and others wiser than himself in other respects; for instance, in times of greatest danger, when people are distressed in war or by diseases or at sea, they regard their commanders as gods and expect them to be their saviors, though they excel them in nothing except knowledge. And all the world of men is, I dare say, full of people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and the animals and for human activities, and, on the other hand, of people who consider themselves qualified to teach and qualified to rule. And in all these instances we must say that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist in the world of men, must we not?
170
THEO. Yes, we must.
170
SOC. And therefore they think that wisdom is true thinking and ignorance false opinion, do they not?
170
THEO. Of course.
