201
SOC. But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different.
201
THEAET. Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable.
201
SOC. I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree.
201
THEAET. But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.
201
SOC. Listen then, while I relate it to you—a dream for a dream. I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation;