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İngilizce Yunanca

203 SOC. In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge.

203 THEAET. I think we have.

203 SOC. But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable?

203 THEAET. Probably.

203 SOC. Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination?

203 THEAET. I think we mean all the letters it contains.

203 SOC. Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not?

203 THEAET. Of course.

203 SOC. He knows, that is, the S and the O.

203 THEAET. Yes.

203 SOC. How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both?

203 THEAET. That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.

203 SOC. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!

203 THEAET. And very suddenly, too.

203 SOC. Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.

203 THEAET. Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.

203 SOC. Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory.

203 THEAET. No, we must not.

204 SOC. Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things.

204 THEAET. Certainly.

204 SOC. Therefore there must be no parts of it.

204 THEAET. How so?

204 SOC. Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is a single concept different from all the parts?

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Şifre Yenileme