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İngilizce Yunanca

240 Theaet. But it does exist, in a way.

240 Str. But not truly, you mean.

240 Theaet. No, except that it is really a likeness.

240 Str. Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?

240 Theaet. Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very absurd.

240 Str. Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.

240 Theaet. Yes, I see that very well.

240 Str. Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?

240 Theaet. Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?

240 Str. When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?

240 Theaet. We shall say that. What else could we say?

240 Str. But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?

240 Theaet. Yes.

240 Str. You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?

240 Theaet. Necessarily.

240 Str. Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?

240 Theaet. It must think that things which are not in some sense are—that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.

240 Str. And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?

240 Theaet. Yes.

240 Str. And this too is falsehood?

240 Theaet. Yes, it is.

241 Str. And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false, if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.

241 Theaet. In what other way could a statement be made false?

241 Str. Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?

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