241
Theaet. Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.
241
Str. You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.
241
Theaet. Very true.
241
Str. Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them, and they are, if I may say so, infinite.
241
Theaet. It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.
241
Str. Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?
241
Theaet. No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.
241
Str. Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?
241
Theaet. Of course I will.
241
Str. I have another still more urgent request to make of you.
241
Theaet. What is it?
241
Str. Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.
241
Theaet. What do you mean?
241
Str. In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.
241
Theaet. It is plain that some such contention is necessary.
241
Str. Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.
241
Theaet. Very true.
