257
Str. And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.
257
Theaet. Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.
257
Str. Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?
257
Theaet. There is.
257
Str. Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?
257
Theaet. That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.
257
Str. Now, then, tell me something more.
257
Theaet. What?
257
Str. Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?
257
Theaet. Yes.
257
Str. Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.
257
Theaet. Quite right.
257
Str. Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?
257
Theaet. Not at all.
258
Str. Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?
258
Theaet. No less truly.
258
Str. And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?
258
Theaet. Of course.
258
Str. And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.
258
Theaet. Of course.
258
Str. Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.
258
Theaet. That is perfectly clear.
258
Str. Then what shall we call this?
258
Theaet. Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.
