260
Str. Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.
260
Theaet. That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.
260
Str. Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.
260
Theaet. What line?
260
Str. We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.
260
Theaet. Yes.
260
Str. So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.
260
Theaet. Why?
260
Str. If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.
260
Theaet. So it is.
260
Str. But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.
260
Theaet. Yes.
260
Str. And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.
260
Theaet. Of course.
260
Str. But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.
260
Theaet. Yes, so it was.
