267
Str. Do all of them, then, fail in the attempt to seem to be just when they are not so at all? Or is quite the opposite the case?
267
Theaet. Quite the opposite.
267
Str. Then I think we must say that such an imitator is quite distinct from the other, the one who does not know from the one who knows.
267
Theaet. Yes.
267
Str. Where, then, can the fitting name for each of the two be found? Clearly it is not an easy task, because there was, it seems, among the earlier thinkers a long established and careless indolence in respect to the division of classes or genera into forms or species, so that nobody even tried to make such divisions; therefore there cannot be a great abundance of names. However, even though the innovation in language be a trifle bold, let us, for the sake of making a distinction, call the imitation which is based on opinion, opinion-imitation, and that which is founded on knowledge, a sort of scientific imitation.
267
Theaet. Agreed.
267
Str. We mat therefore apply ourselves to the former, for we found that the sophist was among those who imitate but was not among those who know.
267
Theaet. Very true.
267
Str. Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam in him.
267
Theaet. Let us do so.
268
Str. Well, there is a very marked seam. For some of these imitators are simple-minded and think they know that about which they have only opinion, but the other kind because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to know.
268
Theaet. Certainly the two classes you mention both exist.
268
Str. Then shall we call one the simple imitator and the other the dissembling imitator?
268
Theaet. That is reaonable, at any rate.
268
Str. And shall we say that the latter forms one class or two again?
268
Theaet. That is your affair.
