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İngilizce Yunanca

21 Soc. But consider whether you would not have some need of wisdom and intelligence and power of calculating your wants and the like.

21 Pro. Why should I? If I have enjoyment, I have everything.

21 Soc. Then living thus you would enjoy the greatest pleasures all your life?

21 Pro. Yes; why not?

21 Soc. But if you did not possess mind or memory or knowledge or true opinion, in the first place, you would not know whether you were enjoying your pleasures or not. That must be true, since you are utterly devoid of intellect, must it not?

21 Pro. Yes, it must.

21 Soc. And likewise, if you had no memory you could not even remember that you ever did enjoy pleasure, and no recollection whatever of present pleasure could remain with you; if you had no true opinion you could not think you were enjoying pleasure at the time when you were enjoying it, and if you were without power of calculation you would not be able to calculate that you would enjoy it in the future; your life would not be that of a man, but of a mollusc or some other shell-fish like the oyster. Is that true, or can we imagine any other result?

21 Pro. We certainly cannot.

21 Soc. And can we choose such a life?

21 Pro. This argument, Socrates, has made me utterly speechless for the present.

21 Soc. Well, let us not give in yet. Let us take up the life of mind and scrutinize that in turn.

21 Pro. What sort of life do you mean?

21 Soc. I ask whether anyone would be willing to live possessing wisdom and mind and knowledge and perfect memory of all things, but having no share, great or small, in pleasure, or in pain, for that matter, but being utterly unaffected by everything of that sort.

21 Pro. Neither of the two lives can ever appear desirable to me, Socrates, or, I think, to anyone else.

22 Soc. How about the combined life, Protarchus, made up by a union of the two?

22 Pro. You mean a union of pleasure with mind or wisdom?

22 Soc. Yes, I mean a union of such elements.

22 Pro. Every one will prefer this life to either of the two others—yes, every single person without exception.

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Şifre Yenileme