26
Pro. True.
26
Soc. And the finite, again, did not contain many classes, nor were we disturbed about its natural unity.
26
Pro. Of course not.
26
Soc. No, not at all. And as to the third class, understand that I mean every offspring of these two which comes into being as a result of the measures created by the cooperation of the finite.
26
Pro. I understand.
26
Soc. But we said there was, in addition to three classes, a fourth to be investigated. Let us do that together. See whether you think that everything which comes into being must necessarily come into being through a cause.
26
Pro. Yes, I do; for how could it come into being apart from a cause?
26
Soc. Does not the nature of that which makes or creates differ only in name from the cause, and may not the creative agent and the cause be properly considered one?
26
Pro. Yes.
27
Soc. And, again, we shall find that, on the same principle, that which is made or created differs in name only from that which comes into being, shall we not?
27
Pro. We shall.
27
Soc. And the creative agent always naturally leads, and that which is created follows after it as it comes into being?
27
Pro. Certainly.
27
Soc. Then the cause and that which is the servant of the cause for the purpose of generation are not the same.
27
Pro. Of course not.
27
Soc. Did not the things which come into being and the things out of which they come into being furnish us all the three classes?
27
Pro. Certainly.
27
Soc. And that which produces all these, the cause, we call the fourth, as it has been satisfactorily shown to be distinct from the others?
27
Pro. Yes, it is distinct.
27
Soc. It is, then, proper, now that we have distinguished the four, to make sure that we remember them separately by enumerating them in order.
27
Pro. Yes, certainly.
27
Soc. The first, then, I call infinite, the second limit or finite, and the third something generated by a mixture of these two. And should I be making any mistake if I called the cause of this mixture and creation the fourth?
27
Pro. Certainly not.
