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Soc. I say, then, that when, in us living beings, harmony is broken up, a disruption of nature and a generation of pain also take place at the same moment.
31
Pro. What you say is very likely.
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Soc. But if harmony is recomposed and returns to its own nature, then I say that pleasure is generated, if I may speak in the fewest and briefest words about matters of the highest import.
31
Pro. I think you are right, Socrates; but let us try to be more explicit.
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Soc. It is easiest to understand common and obvious examples, is it not?
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Pro. What examples?
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Soc. Is hunger a kind of breaking up and a pain?
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Pro. Yes.
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Soc. And eating, which is a filling up again, is a pleasure?
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Pro. Yes.
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Soc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the filling with moisture of that which was dried up is a pleasure. Then, too, the unnatural dissolution and disintegration we experience through heat are a pain, but the natural restoration and cooling are a pleasure.
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Pro. Certainly.
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Soc. And the unnatural hardening of the moisture in an animal through cold is pain; but the natural course of the elements returning to their place and separating is a pleasure. See, in short, if you think it is a reasonable statement that whenever in the class of living beings, which, as I said before, arises out of the natural union of the infinite and the finite, that union is destroyed, the destruction is pain, and the passage and return of all things to their own nature is pleasure.
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Pro. Let us accept that; for it seems to me to be true in its general lines.
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Soc. Then we may assume this as one kind of pain and pleasure arising severally under the conditions I have described?
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Pro. Let that be assumed.
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Soc. Now assume within the soul itself the anticipation of these conditions, the sweet and cheering hope of pleasant things to come, the fearful and woful expectation of painful things to come.
