36
Pro. Opinions I would grant you, but not the rest.
36
Soc. What? I am afraid we are starting a very considerable discussion.
36
Pro. You are right.
36
Soc. And yet we must consider, thou son of that man, Son of that man may mean son of Philebus, in so far as Protarchus is a pupil of Philebus, or (so Bury) son of Gorgias, the orator and teacher (cf. Plat. Phaedo 58b), or the father of Protarchus may be referred to by the pronoun, possibly because Socrates does not at the moment recall his name or because he wishes to imply that he was a man of mark. whether the discussion is relevant to what has gone before.
36
Pro. Yes, no doubt.
36
Soc. We must dismiss everything else, tedious or otherwise, that is irrelevant.
36
Pro. Right.
36
Soc. Now tell me; for I am always utterly amazed by the same questions we were just proposing.
36
Pro. What do you mean?
36
Soc. Are not some pleasures false and others true?
36
Pro. How could that be?
36
Soc. Then, as you maintain, nobody, either sleeping or waking or insane or deranged, ever thinks he feels pleasure when he does not feel it, and never, on the other hand, thinks he suffers pain when he does not suffer it?
36
Pro. We have, Socrates, always believed that all this is as you suggest.
37
Soc. But is the belief correct? Shall we consider whether it is so or not?
37
Pro. I should say we ought to consider that.
37
Soc. Then let us analyze still more clearly what we were just now saying about pleasure and opinion. There is a faculty of having an opinion, is there not?
37
Pro. Yes.
37
Soc. And of feeling pleasure?
37
Pro. Yes.
37
Soc. And there is an object of opinion?
37
Pro. Of course.
37
Soc. And something by which that which feels pleasure is pleased?
37
Pro. Certainly.
37
Soc. And that which has opinion, whether right or wrong, never loses its function of really having opinion?
37
Pro. Of course not.
37
Soc. And that which feels pleasure, whether rightly or wrongly, will clearly never lose its function of really feeling pleasure?
37
Pro. Yes, that is true, too.
