37
Soc. Then we must consider how it is that opinion is both true and false and pleasure only true, though the holding of opinion and the feeling of pleasure are equally real.
37
Pro. Yes, so we must.
37
Soc. You mean that we must consider this question because falsehood and truth are added as attributes to opinion, and thereby it becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality in each instance?
37
Pro. Yes.
37
Soc. And furthermore, we must reach an agreement on the question whether, even if some things have qualities, pleasure and pain are not merely what they are, without qualities or attributes.
37
Pro. Evidently we must.
37
Soc. But it is easy enough to see that they have qualities. For we said a long time ago that both pains and pleasures are great and small and intense.
37
Pro. Yes, certainly.
37
Soc. And if badness becomes an attribute of any of these, Protarchus, shall we say that the opinion or the pleasure thereby becomes bad?
37
Pro. Why certainly, Socrates.
37
Soc. And what if rightness or its opposite becomes an attribute of one of them? Shall we not say that the opinion is right, if it has rightness, and the pleasure likewise?
37
Pro. Obviously.
37
Soc. And if that which is opined is mistaken, must we not agree that the opinion, since it is at the moment making a mistake, is not right or rightly opining?
37
Pro. Of course.
37
Soc. And what if we see a pain or a pleasure making a mistake in respect of that by which the pain or pleasure is caused? Shall we give it the attribute of right or good or any of the words which denote excellence?
37
Pro. That is impossible if the pleasure is mistaken.
37
Soc. And certainly pleasure often seems to come to us in connection with false, not true, opinion.
38
Pro. Of course it does; and in such a case, Socrates, we call the opinion false; but nobody would ever call the actual pleasure false.
38
Soc. You are an eager advocate of the case of pleasure just now, Protarchus.
38
Pro. Oh no, I merely say what I hear.
