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Soc. And the same may be said of fear and anger and all that sort of thing—that they are all sometimes false?
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Pro. Certainly.
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Soc. Well, can we say that opinions become bad or good except as they become false?
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Pro. No.
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Soc. And we understand, I believe, that pleasures also are not bad except by being false.
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Pro. No; you have said quite the reverse of the truth, Socrates; for no one would be at all likely to call pains and pleasures bad because they are false, but because they are involved in another great and manifold evil.
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Soc. Then of the evil pleasures which are such because of evil we will speak a little later, if we still care to do so; but of the false pleasures we must prove in another way that they exist and come into existence in us often and in great numbers; for this may help us to reach our decisions.
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Pro. Yes, of course; that is, if such pleasures exist.
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Soc. But they do exist, Protarchus, in my opinion; however, until we have established the truth of this opinion, it cannot be unquestioned.
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Pro. Good.
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Soc. Then let us, like athletes, approach and grapple with this new argument.
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Pro. Let us do so.
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Soc. We said, you may remember, a little while ago, that when desires, as they are called, exist in us, the soul is apart from the body and separate from it in feelings.
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Pro. I remember; that was said.
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Soc. And was not the soul that which desired the opposites of the conditions of the body and the body that which caused pleasure or pain because of feeling?
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Pro. Yes, that was the case.
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Soc. Then draw the conclusion as to what takes place in these circumstances.
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Pro. Go on.
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Soc. What takes place is this: in these circumstances pleasures and pains exist at the same time and the sensations of opposite pleasures and pains are present side by side simultaneously, as was made clear just now.
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Pro. Yes, that is clear.
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Soc. And have we not also said and agreed and settled something further?
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Pro. What?
