41
Soc. That both pleasure and pain admit of the more and less and are of the class of the infinite.
41
Pro. Yes, we have said that, certainly.
41
Soc. Then what means is there of judging rightly of this?
41
Pro. How and in what way do you mean?
41
Soc. I mean to ask whether the purpose of our judgement of these matters in such circumstances is to recognize in each instance which of these elements is greater or smaller or more intense, comparing pain with pleasure, pain with pain, and pleasure with pleasure.
41
Pro. Certainly there are such differences, and that is the purpose of our judgement.
42
Soc. Well then, in the case of sight, seeing things from too near at hand or from too great a distance obscures their real sizes and causes us to have false opinions; and does not this same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures?
42
Pro. Yes, Socrates, even much more than in the case of sight.
42
Soc. Then our present conclusion is the opposite of what we said a little while ago.
42
Pro. To what do you refer?
42
Soc. A while ago these opinions, being false or true, imbued the pains and pleasures with their own condition of truth or falsehood.
42
Pro. Very true.
42
Soc. But now, because they are seen at various and changing distances and are compared with one another, the pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison with the pains, and the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary inversely as they.
42
Pro. That is inevitable for the reasons you have given.
42
Soc. They both, then, appear greater and less than the reality. Now if you abstract from both of them this apparent, but unreal, excess or inferiority, you cannot say that its appearance is true, nor again can you have the face to affirm that the part of pleasure or pain which corresponds to this is true or real.
42
Pro. No, I cannot.
42
Soc. Next, then, we will see whether we may not in another direction come upon pleasures and pains still more false than these appearing and existing in living beings.
