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Soc. A better and more unassailable statement would be this.
43
Pro. What?
43
Soc. That the great changes cause pains and pleasures in us, but the moderate and small ones cause no pains or pleasures at all.
43
Pro. That is more correct than the other statement, Socrates.
43
Soc. But if that is the case, the life of which we spoke just now would come back again.
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Pro. What life?
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Soc. The life which we said was painless and without joys.
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Pro. Very true.
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Soc. Let us, therefore, assume three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and one neither of the two; or do you disagree?
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Pro. No, I agree to this, that there are the three lives.
43
Soc. Then freedom from pain would not be identical with pleasure?
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Pro. Certainly not.
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Soc. When you hear anyone say that the pleasantest of all things is to live all one’s life without pain, what do you understand him to mean?
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Pro. I think he means that freedom from pain is pleasure.
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Soc. Now let us assume that we have three things; no matter what they are, but let us use fine names and call one gold, another silver, and the third neither of the two.
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Pro. Agreed.
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Soc. Now can that which is neither become either gold or silver?
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Pro. Certainly not.
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Soc. Neither can that middle life of which we spoke ever be rightly considered in opinion or called in speech pleasant or painful, at any rate by those who reason correctly.
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Pro. No, certainly not.
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Soc. But surely, my friend, we are aware of persons who call it and consider it so.
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Pro. Certainly.
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Soc. Do they, then, think they feel pleasure whenever they are not in pain?
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Pro. That is what they say.
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Soc. Then they do think they feel pleasure at such times; for otherwise they would not say so.
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Pro. Most likely.
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Soc. Certainly, then, they have a false opinion about pleasure, if there is an essential difference between feeling pleasure and not feeling pain.
44
Pro. And we certainly found that difference.
