49
Soc. Then the false conceits of our friends concerning their wisdom, their beauty, and their other qualities which we mentioned just now, saying that they belong to three classes, are ridiculous when they are weak, but hateful when they are powerful. Shall we, or shall we not, affirm that, as I said just now, this state of mind when possessed in its harmless form by any of our friends, is ridiculous in the eyes of others?
49
Pro. Certainly it is ridiculous.
49
Soc. And do we not agree that ignorance is in itself a misfortune?
49
Pro. Yes, a great one.
49
Soc. And do we feel pleasure or pain when we laugh at it?
50
Pro. Pleasure, evidently.
50
Soc. Did we not say that pleasure in the misfortunes of friends was caused by envy?
50
Pro. There can be no other cause.
50
Soc. Then our argument declares that when we laugh at the ridiculous qualities of our friends, we mix pleasure with pain, since we mix it with envy; for we have agreed all along that envy is a pain of the soul, and that laughter is a pleasure, yet these two are present at the same time on such occasions.
50
Pro. True.
50
Soc. So now our argument shows that in mournings and tragedies and comedies, not merely on the stage, but in all the tragedy and comedy of life, and in countless other ways, pain is mixed with pleasure.
50
Pro. It is impossible not to agree with that, Socrates, even though one be most eager to maintain the opposite opinion.
50
Soc. Again we mentioned anger, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like, as conditions in which we should find a mixture of the two elements we have now often named, did we not?
50
Pro. Yes.
50
Soc. And we understand that all the details I have been describing just now are concerned only with sorrow and envy and anger?
50
Pro. Of course we understand that.
50
Soc. Then there are still many others of those conditions left for us to discuss.
50
Pro. Yes, very many.
