59
Soc. Very well. As to the mixture of wisdom and pleasure, if anyone were to say that we are like artisans, with the materials before us from which to create our work, the simile would be a good one.
59
Pro. Certainly.
59
Soc. And is it, then, our next task to try to make the mixture?
59
Pro. Surely.
59
Soc. Would it not be better first to repeat certain things and recall them to our minds?
59
Pro. What things?
60
Soc. Those which we mentioned before. I think the proverb we ought to repeat twice and even three times that which is good is an excellent one.
60
Pro. Surely.
60
Soc. Well then, in God’s name; I think this is the gist of our discussion.
60
Pro. What is it?
60
Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal of every living being and that all ought to aim at it, and that therefore this is also the good for all, and the two designations good and pleasant are properly and essentially one; Socrates, however, says that they are not one, but two in fact as in name, that the good and the pleasant differ from one another in nature, and that wisdom’s share in the good is greater than pleasure’s. Is not and was not that what was said, Protarchus?
60
Pro. Yes, certainly.
60
Soc. And furthermore, is not and was not this a point of agreement among us?
60
Pro. What?
60
Soc. That the nature of the good differs from all else in this respect.
60
Pro. In what respect?
60
Soc. That whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether, and in all ways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectly sufficient. We agreed to that?
60
Pro. We did.
60
Soc. And then we tried in thought to separate each from the other and apply them to individual lives, pleasure unmixed with wisdom and likewise wisdom which had not the slightest alloy of pleasure?
60
Pro. Yes.
60
Soc. And did we think then that either of them would be sufficient for any one?
60
Pro. By no means.
