61
Soc. We are like wine-pourers, and beside us are fountains—that of pleasure may be likened to a fount of honey, and the sober, wineless fount of wisdom to one of pure, health-giving water—of which we must do our best to mix as well as possible.
61
Pro. Certainly we must.
61
Soc. Before we make the mixture, tell me: should we be most likely to succeed by mixing all pleasure with all wisdom?
61
Pro. Perhaps.
61
Soc. But that is not safe; and I think I can offer a plan by which we can make our mixture with less risk.
61
Pro. What is it?
61
Soc. We found, I believe, that one pleasure was greater than another and one art more exact than another?
61
Pro. Certainly.
61
Soc. And knowledge was of two kinds, one turning its eyes towards transitory things, the other towards things which neither come into being nor pass away, but are the same and immutable for ever. Considering them with a view to truth, we judged that the latter was truer than the former.
61
Pro. That is quite right.
61
Soc. Then what if we first mix the truest sections of each and see whether, when mixed together, they are capable of giving us the most adorable life, or whether we still need something more and different?
62
Pro. I think that is what we should do.
62
Soc. Let us assume, then, a man who possesses wisdom about the nature of justice itself, and reason in accordance with his wisdom, and has the same kind of knowledge of all other things.
62
Pro. Agreed.
62
Soc. Now will this man have sufficient knowledge, if he is master of the theory of the divine circle and sphere, but is ignorant of our human sphere and human circles, even when he uses these and other kinds of rules or patterns in building houses?
62
Pro. We call that a ridiculous state of intellect in a man, Socrates, which is concerned only with divine knowledge.
62
Soc. What? Do you mean to say that the uncertain and impure art of the false rule and circle is to be put into our mixture?
62
Pro. Yes, that is inevitable, if any man is ever to find his own way home.
