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Pro. Apparently, Socrates, when you said the third time just now, you meant that we must take up our argument again from the beginning.
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Soc. Yes; but let us hear what follows. For I, perceiving the truths which I have now been detailing, and annoyed by the theory held not only by Philebus but by many thousands of others, said that mind was a far better and more excellent thing for human life than pleasure.
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Pro. True.
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Soc. But suspecting that there were many other things to be considered, I said that if anything should be found better than these two, I should support mind against pleasure in the struggle for the second place, and even the second place would be lost by pleasure.
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Pro. Yes, that is what you said.
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Soc. And next it was most sufficiently proved that each of these two was insufficient.
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Pro. Very true.
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Soc. In this argument, then, both mind and pleasure were set aside; neither of them is the absolute good, since they are devoid of self-sufficiency, adequacy, and perfection?
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Pro. Quite right.
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Soc. And on the appearance of a third competitor, better than either of these, mind is now found to be ten thousand times more akin than pleasure to the victor.
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Pro. Certainly.
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Soc. Then, according to the judgement which has now been given by our discussion, the power of pleasure would be fifth.
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Pro. So it seems.
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Soc. But not first, even if all the cattle and horses and other beasts in the world, in their pursuit of enjoyment, so assert. Trusting in them, as augurs trust in birds, the many judge that pleasures are the greatest blessings in life, and they imagine that the lusts of beasts are better witnesses than are the aspirations and thoughts inspired by the philosophic muse.
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Pro. Socrates, we all now declare that what you have said is perfectly true.
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Soc. Then you will let me go?
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Pro. There is still a little left, Socrates. I am sure you will not give up before we do, and I will remind you of what remains.
