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İngilizce Yunanca

261 Phaedrus. Certainly.

261 Socrates. And in political speaking he will make the same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite?

261 Phaedrus. Just so.

261 Socrates. Do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?

261 Phaedrus. Certainly.

261 Socrates. Then the art of contention in speech is not confined to courts and political gatherings, but apparently, if it is an art at all, it would be one and the same in all kinds of speaking, the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.

261 Phaedrus. What do you mean by that?

261 Socrates. I think it will be plain if we examine the matter in this way. Is deception easier when there is much difference between things or when there is little?

262 Phaedrus. When there is little.

262 Socrates. And if you make a transition by small steps from anything to its opposite you will be more likely to escape detection than if you proceed by leaps and bounds.

262 Phaedrus. Of course.

262 Socrates. Then he who is to deceive another, and is not to be deceived himself, must know accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things.

262 Phaedrus. Yes, he must.

262 Socrates. Now will he be able, not knowing the truth about a given thing, to recognize in other things the great or small degree of likeness to that which he does not know?

262 Phaedrus. It is impossible.

262 Socrates. In the case, then, of those whose opinions are at variance with facts and who are deceived, this error evidently slips in through some resemblances.

262 Phaedrus. It does happen in that way.

262 Socrates. Then he who does not understand the real nature of things will not possess the art of making his hearers pass from one thing to its opposite by leading them through the intervening resemblances, or of avoiding such deception himself?

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Şifre Yenileme