115
Soc. And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter?
115
Alc. Yes.
115
Soc. Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst?
115
Alc. To be sure.
115
Soc. So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst.
115
Alc. I do.
115
Soc. Then the rescue of one’s friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble?
115
Alc. Apparently.
115
Soc. But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death?
115
Alc. Yes.
116
Soc. So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, so you must call it good because of the good it produces.
116
Alc. I believe that is so.
116
Soc. And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil?
116
Alc. Yes.
116
Soc. Then in saying that the rescue of one’s friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.
116
Alc. I believe what you say is true, Socrates.
116
Soc. So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good.
116
Alc. Apparently.
116
Soc. Now then, consider it again in this way: whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not?
116
Alc. Yes.
116
Soc. And are not those who do well happy?
116
Alc. Of course.
116
Soc. And they are happy because of the acquisition of good things?
116
Alc. Certainly.
116
Soc. And they acquire these by doing well and nobly?
116
Alc. Yes.
116
Soc. So doing well is good?
116
Alc. Of course.
116
Soc. And welfare is noble?
116
Alc. Yes.
