116
Soc. Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing.
116
Alc. Apparently.
116
Soc. Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least.
116
Alc. We must.
116
Soc. Well then, are good things expedient or not?
116
Alc. Expedient.
116
Soc. And do you remember what our admissions were about just things?
116
Alc. I think we said that those who do just things must do noble things.
116
Soc. And that those who do noble things must do good things?
116
Alc. Yes.
116
Soc. And that good things are expedient?
116
Alc. Yes.
116
Soc. Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.
116
Alc. So it seems.
116
Soc. Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner?
116
Alc. I seem to be, apparently.
116
Soc. So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, Peparethus is a small island off the coast of Thessaly. imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same?
116
Alc. But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.
116
Soc. And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is?
116
Alc. I am, quite.
116
Soc. Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing?
117
Alc. I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer.
117
Soc. And the reason would be, because you know?
117
Alc. I think so.
117
Soc. Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant.
117
Alc. Very likely.
