129
Soc. Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself This seems to be a sudden adumbration of the Platonic idea or form which remains constant, and so the same, behind the shifting objects of sense related to it through its influences or impress. Cf. below, Plat. Alc. 1.130d. be discovered? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail.
129
Alc. Rightly spoken.
129
Soc. Steady, then, in Heaven’s name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not?
129
Alc. Yes.
129
Soc. And I in turn to you ?
129
Alc. Yes.
129
Soc. Then the talker is Socrates?
129
Alc. To be sure.
129
Soc. And the hearer, Alcibiades?
129
Alc. Yes.
129
Soc. And Socrates uses speech in talking?
129
Alc. Of course.
129
Soc. And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.
129
Alc. To be sure.
129
Soc. But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not?
129
Alc. How do you mean?
129
Soc. For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts.
129
Alc. Yes.
129
Soc. And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting?
129
Alc. Of course.
129
Soc. And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself?
129
Alc. Yes.
129
Soc. Well then, that is what I was asking just now—whether the user and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.
129
Alc. They are.
129
Soc. Then what are we to say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well?
129
Alc. With his hands as well.
129
Soc. So he uses these also?
129
Alc. Yes.
129
Soc. Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making?
129
Alc. Yes.
