139
Soc. And is every ophthalmia, in your opinion, a disease?
139
Alc. Yes.
139
Soc. And is every disease also ophthalmia?
139
Alc. No, I should think not: still, I am in doubt as to my meaning.
140
Soc. Well, if you will attend to me, two together Cf. Hom. Il. 10.224 σύν τε δύ’ ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν ὅππως κέρδος ἔῃ, if two go along together, then one marks before the other how advantage may be had. will be searching, and so mayhap we shall find what we seek.
140
Alc. Nay, but I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power.
140
Soc. Then we have admitted that while every ophthalmia is a disease, every disease, on the other hand, is not ophthalmia?
140
Alc. We have.
140
Soc. And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout or ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors— in its manifestation. ἀπεργασία here seems to be used for effect produced instead of its usual meaning, fully effecting, completion. For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not?
140
Alc. Certainly.
140
Soc. That is, cobblers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have their several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen.
140
Alc. No, indeed.
