227
Soc. And we admitted that gain is good?
227
Fr. Yes.
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Soc. On this new showing, everyone appears to be a lover of gain; whereas, by our former way of arguing, no one was a lover of gain. So on which of the two arguments are we to rely, in order to avoid error?
227
Fr. What has to be done, I think, Socrates, is to conceive the lover of gain rightly. The right view of the lover of gain is that he is one who concerns himself with, and thinks fit to make gain from, things from which honest men do not dare to make gain.
227
Soc. But you see, my sweet sir, we have just admitted that making gain is being benefited.
227
Fr. Well, what of that?
227
Soc. There is the further point we have admitted in addition to this—that all men wish for good things always.
227
Fr. Yes.
227
Soc. Then good men likewise wish to have all gains, if these are good things.
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Fr. Not those gains from which they are bound, Socrates, to suffer harm.
227
Soc. By “suffer harm” do you mean “suffer loss,” or something else?
227
Fr. No, I mean just “suffer loss.”
227
Soc. Well, do men suffer loss from gain or from loss?
227
Fr. From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked gain.
227
Soc. Pray now, do you consider that any useful and good thing is wicked?
227
Fr. I do not.
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Soc. And we admitted a little while ago that gain is the opposite of loss, which is an evil.
228
Fr. I agree.
228
Soc. And that, being the opposite of an evil, it is good?
228
Fr. That was our admission.
228
Soc. So you see, you are attempting to deceive me, for you deliberately contradict what we agreed to just now.
228
Fr. No, on my honor, Socrates; on the contrary, it is you who are deceiving me, by twisting this way and that so perplexingly in your talk.
228
Soc. Hush, hush! Why, surely it would be wrong of me not to obey a good and wise person.
228
Fr. Who is that? And to what are you referring now?
